A General Without His Due: John Curtis Caldwell,
Brevet Major General USV
By Patricia Caldwell
All too often Civil War history is known only by the Grants, the
Lees, the Jacksons and the Shermans. The real history is instead a
composite of the division and brigade commanders, the regimental
colonels and the private soldiers. These can arguably be called the
real heroes of the Civil War.
One such of these was an educator from Maine who went on to become a
general and, by virtue of his actions at Gettysburg, did as much, or
more, to contribute to the Union victory as any one else on the
field. No, I don’t mean Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. The officer in
question is General John Curtis Caldwell, commander of the First
Division of the heroic II Corps of the Army of the Potomac, whose
men helped save the army from defeat in the Wheatfield and on the
Stony Hill.
John Curtis Caldwell was born on April 17, 1833 in Lowell, Vermont,
the son of George M. and Elizabeth Curtis Caldwell. After attending
Lowell High School, John entered the prestigious Amherst College
from which he graduated in the class of 1855, steeped in classics
and philosophy. He was a member of Delta Upsilon and the Phi Beta
Kappa honor society. After graduation young Caldwell obtained a
position as principal of Washington Academy in East Machias, Maine.
He continued in this position for about five years until war broke
out in 1861. While at Washington Academy he married Martha H. Foster
of East Machias on May 15, 1857. Eventually they went on to become
the parents of eight children.
In the early days of the war, 28-year-old John Curtis Caldwell was
mustered into federal service as Colonel of the newly formed 11th
Maine Volunteer Infantry. Given the fact that Colonel Caldwell had
no prior military experience his mustering in as colonel would
appear to indicate that the principal from Maine exhibited something
special. The 11th Maine was mustered in on November 12, 1861 and
departed for Washington the next day, after a hearty send-off by
Governor Washburn. After stopping in Portland and Boston the
regiment took a steamer to New York City; from there they took the
cars to Philadelphia and points south. The regiment arrived at
Washington on the evening of November 15. The 11th Maine then set up
camp at Camp Knox on Meridian Hill overlooking the capital city,
where they spent the winter perfecting drill and discipline and
otherwise learning the art of war.
On March 30, 1862 Colonel Caldwell and his regiment, now part of the
3rd Brigade of Casey’s Division of the IV Corps departed with
McClellan’s army for the Peninsula. Apparently Caldwell was well
liked by his regiment, who appreciated his down-to-earth qualities.
During the campaigning as the army was on the move, one of the
members of the regiment recorded the following incident:
“As the different commands of our army moved
forward, they converged on the road leading from Yorktown to
Williamsburg, with the result that this road was soon packed with
horses, foot, and artillery, all pushing eagerly forward, and
without overmuch regard for rights of way. Company D held the right
of the regiment, so that its members were pleased auditors to a
conversation between Colonel Caldwell and the irate commander of a
regiment the Eleventh had unceremoniously displaced. The commander
of the displaced regiment was evidently, by his manner and seat in
the saddle, a regular officer, which then meant, among other things,
an officer with large ideas of his own importance as a trained
military man, and small ones of all volunteer officers. “Sir,”
roared he, riding up to Colonel Caldwell, “how dare you march across
the head of my command?” Without answering him, the colonel looked
at him in his large, placid way, much as a mastiff looks at a
snarling terrier. “Do you know who I am, sir?” yelled the angry
commander, now doubly enraged at the elaborate indifference and the
apparent studied silence of our colonel. “I am Major So and So of
such and such a regiment.” “And I, “ answered Colonel Caldwell,
smiling blandly, touching his cap with military courtesy as he spoke
– “ and I am Colonel John C. Caldwell, commanding the Eleventh
Regiment of Maine Infantry Volunteers, and am quite at your service,
sir.” Speechless with rage, and fairly gasping at the approving
haw-haw we country bumpkins gave at the Colonel’s answer, Major So
and So backed his horse a little, turned him, and galloped away in
as furious a state of mind as any gallant major ever rode in.”
But Colonel Caldwell’s tenure with the 11th Maine was not to last
very long. On May 13, 1862 Caldwell left the regiment, having been
promoted to Brigadier General to rank from April 28. From this point
onward General Caldwell participated in every battle of the Army of
the Potomac until the reorganization of the army in the spring of
1864 – always as part of the elite II Corps. Along the way he
commanded the 1st Brigade of the First Division of the II Corps,
then was promoted to command the First Division, and on occasion,
was elevated as ranking officer to the temporary command of II
Corps.
Brief biographical sketches of General Caldwell are curious. They
say things like “there was something lacking in Caldwell’s ability,
or so thought his superiors” , and “war record adequate, not
spectacular” , and “competent but not outstanding division
commander”
Caldwell apparently led with distinction during the Peninsula
Campaign, in particular, during the Seven Days Battles. He was
personally thanked for his “personal gallantry” in supporting
Kearney’s Division at Glendale. General Israel Richardson, First
Division commander, in a postscript to his official report on July
6, 1862, stated
“…I cannot too much commend the admirable manner in which my three
brigadier-generals – French, Meagher, and Caldwell – have done their
duty with their brigades… If anything can try the patience and
bravery of troops it must be their fighting all day for five
consecutive days and then falling back every night.”
At Antietam, however, there occurs what apparently may be the only
blemish on his record. While commanding his brigade, Caldwell is
accused of being slow to come to the support of Meagher and his
Irish Brigade. One allegation relates that Caldwell’s brigade was
waiting for orders to go into battle while their brigadier
disappeared and the men would not advance without him. According to
the legend when General Richardson came looking for his brigadier a
member of the 5th New Hampshire, Thomas Livermore, shouted in
response to the general’s question, “Behind the haystack”, to which
Richardson supposedly answered “God damn the field officers.”
Colonel Edward Cross, leading one of Caldwell’s regiments was heard
to have referred to his commanding officer as a “damned coward” .
However, Cross also referred to General Meagher as a drunkard, and
apparently had a history of disputes with his co-officers and
company commanders. In a comment on Colonel Cross, historian Harry
Pfanz compliments General Caldwell – “perhaps it is something of a
tribute to Caldwell that he could command a person like Cross.”
Unfortunately, General Richardson was subsequently mortally wounded,
and while he didn’t succumb to his wounds until weeks after the
battle, he was unable to leave an account of the battle. Ironically,
with his division commander down, Caldwell succeeded to temporary
command of the division. No mention of these charges against the
general were made at any time after the battle.
In his official report, General Caldwell makes no mention of the
charges of cowardice. He does however state that he was with the 7th
New York Infantry, personally leading them in their charge. Is this
account of cowardice and disappearance accurate? Subsequent accounts
of the battle of Antietam seem to point back to one primary account,
that of Thomas Livermore. On the other side of the ledger, modern
historians seem to be taking another look at these charges.
Author James V. Murfin sees Caldwell’s arrival on the field as “one
of the smoothest exhibitions of troop movements in the entire
battle”. Historian Robert K. Krick in discussing the action of
Richardson’s Division at the Bloody Lane writes “When Gen. John C.
Caldwell arrived with his brigade, he responded to the eminently
sound impulse to extend the Federal left. This was the first attempt
to envelop the highly vulnerable Confederate right. Richardson
foolishly canceled Caldwell’s initiative, ordering him instead
simply to bolster Meagher’s position.” Obviously Krick expressed
some admiration for Caldwell’s generalship, an asset that would be
remarked on again at Gettysburg.
With the disablement of Richardson, Winfield Scott Hancock was
tapped to assume command of the division from General Caldwell.
Later that fall, Caldwell’s brigade, along with the rest of the
division and corps were engaged in the battle of Fredericksburg.
Couch’s II Corps was thrown, division by division, at the Stone Wall
at Marye’s Heights against the entrenched Confederates. Caldwell’s
division was among the commands with the highest number of
casualties, the general himself receiving two wounds. While
preparing his brigades to attack Marye’s Heights, General Caldwell
received a wound to his left side, but refused to leave the field,
until he was again struck, this time in the left shoulder, at which
time he turned over command to one of his colonels and sought
medical attention. Caldwell’s action here disputes the earlier
allegation of cowardice.
By May of 1863, the division under Hancock had already earned an
unenviable reputation for their combat record. However, as new army
commander Joe Hooker began his spring campaign, his II Corps shock
troops were not in his initial plans. But pressure mounted on
General Sykes’ division of General George Meade’s V Corps and the
call went out for support. Hancock answered, with Caldwell’s brigade
taking the lead. After digging in around the Chancellor House,
Caldwell’s men endured several days of fighting, finally fighting
back-to-back on two fronts, in opposite directions. As Hooker made
the decision that his army would retreat, Hancock’s Division was
ordered to cover the army’s retreat. Here’s Caldwell’s brigade and
the rest of the division played a major role in saving the Union
army, serving as a reserve, plugging gaps in the line, changing
fronts as necessary, and supporting artillery. It was a role of
savior that they would play on a larger scale just two months later.
Thirty-year-old John Curtis Caldwell was given command of his
division on May 22, 1863 when Winfield Scott Hancock was promoted to
command of II Corps, succeeding Darius Couch. This division command
would last until the Army of the Potomac was reorganized in March
1864. As the II Corps was put on the road to Gettysburg, Caldwell
was one of the more experienced general officers. On July 2, the
federal army was strung out along Cemetery Ridge as the various
components came on the scene. As the II Corps arrived on the field
about 7:00 am they were put in a reserve position on Cemetery Hill
and allowed to rest. At about 3:00 pm General Sickles, in a
well-documented forward movement, advanced his line, and created a
salient with his III Corps. Hancock, along with several other
officers, Caldwell among them, saw the movement and wondered on its
significance, while recognizing that they would “soon come tumbling
back”. As Sickles put out the call for assistance, Hancock turned to
his First Division commander and instructed him to get his division
ready.
Knowing that time was of the essence Caldwell had his four brigades
in motion within minutes, with orders to report to General Sykes of
the V Corps for instructions on where to place his troops. Because
of the reserve position of the II Corps the men of the First
Division were not in a correct marching position, but to accomplish
this would have required a complete countermarch for each regiment
in the division. Aware that this would waste precious time, Caldwell
ignored this familiar marching structure and moved his troops out in
a “backwards order”, trusting to the skill and professionalism of
his officers and men. To General Caldwell it was a risk worth
taking. Battlefield guide D. Scott Hartwig has studied in detail
Caldwell’s movements to and in the Wheatfield and he states that
“the wisdom of Caldwell’s movement in mass became more apparent as
the division neared the battle zone.” By his quick and decisive
thinking Caldwell had placed three of his four brigades into action
in less than ten minutes and “would keep his finger on the pulse of
action” throughout the fighting in the Wheatfield. As the fighting
became more frenetic and heated Caldwell responded to his brigades’
call for support by dispatching his aides to other officers for
assistance, until he was forced by circumstances to act as his own
staff officer, personally appealing to other general officers as the
fighting became more and more desperate.
As the day ended Caldwell and his division had rescued the line and
held against numerous Confederate onslaughts. It was noted that
Caldwell had led the only division-sized assault in an otherwise
defensive battle at Gettysburg. Hartwig has also come to the
conclusion that Caldwell’s actions are all the more noteworthy
because no higher authority, either at corps level or especially
army level, had attempted to take control of the situation, given
the fact that elements of three different corps were hotly involved
in the Wheatfield fighting. Caldwell and his First Division had done
as much as any other unit to save the Union Army that day.
However, after the battle, V Corps commander, General Sykes
complained to General Hancock that Caldwell’s division had “done
badly”, but investigation shortly after and the record ever since
have proven that the reverse was true. Caldwell indeed had
contributed a “nearly flawless performance” in stabilizing the Union
line and buying time for additional forces to arrive on the field,
albeit at the expense of devastating casualties to his men.
Despite Caldwell’s performance and a remark from Hancock’s own staff
officer Lt. Colonel C. H. Morgan that “no troops on the field had
done better”, General Caldwell was overlooked for promotion.
On the death of General Reynolds on July 1, General Meade, in
command of the Army of the Potomac, had given Winfield Hancock left
wing command of the I, III and V Corps, while ordering Hancock to
turn over command of his II Corps to General John Gibbon, outranked
by General Caldwell who technically should have received corps
command. Later on the evening of July 1, Hancock turned over field
command to General Slocum of the XII Corps when he arrived on the
field, himself resuming command of II Corps. Then, on July 2 when
Meade was informed of Sickles’ wounding, he gave additional command
of III Corps to Hancock, who again transferred field command of II
Corps to Gibbon. This situation remained until both Gibbon and
Hancock were wounded in the action of July 3, at which time Hancock
turned corps command over to John Caldwell. Hancock’s decision was
overturned and corps command was given short-term to General William
Hays (also outranked by Caldwell) and eventually to General
Gouverneur Warren for the duration of Hancock’s recovery period.
In retrospect it might appear that General Caldwell’s failure to be
given higher command somehow reflects on his actions or abilities.
However, given Meade’s predilection for West Pointers and his carte
blanche from the War Department, it would rather appear that Meade
preferred to surround himself with West Pointers in command and
would do what he needed to ensure that.
Gettysburg was the high point for many careers and quite possibly
was also for General John Curtis Caldwell. Caldwell served with
continued distinction during Meade’s pursuit of the Army of Northern
Virginia from Pennsylvania, and also in the actions of the fall of
1863 and early 1864, receiving high praise from General Warren in
the process. All the while Caldwell continued to praise his
subordinates and recommend after-action promotion for them.
With the attrition suffered by the Army of the Potomac in its many
campaigns, in the spring of 1864 the Army was reorganized. The
number of corps was reduced from five to three, with consolidation
of several corps and divisions into one corps. In the
reorganization, General John C. Caldwell lost his command, in my
opinion, because of his lack of West Point training rather than due
to any flaw or failure on his part, despite the fact that historians
have tended to blame the loss of command on a lack of confidence
that his superiors had in him.
General Caldwell continued the war in Washington DC, serving as
President of a Military Commission. As a tribute to General
Caldwell, he was chosen to represent the United States Volunteers on
the guard of honor for the assassinated President Lincoln, escorting
his body on the long journey from Washington back home to
Springfield, Illinois. Not a bad honor for a non-West Point-educated
principal from Maine! On January 15, 1866 General Caldwell was
mustered out of federal service, holding a brevet rank of Major
General which had been conferred on him on August 19, 1865 for war
service.
Nor was General Caldwell’s service to his country completed. After
the war John C. Caldwell was admitted to the bar in Maine and served
as Maine’s Adjutant General from 1867 to 1869. General Caldwell
re-entered federal service with several consecutive diplomatic
posts. He was Consul to Valparaiso, Chile from 1869 to 1874, and
Minister to Uruguay from 1874 to 1882.
Returning to the States, he practiced law in Topeka, Kansas during
the period of 1882 to 1885. While there he also served as Chairman
of the Kansas Board of Pardons from 1885 to 1893 and again from 1895
to 1897. He also was appointed during this period as Commissioner to
report to the Kansas Legislature on settlement of all claims against
the federal government growing out of the Price Raid of 1864. With
the election of President McKinley, John Curtis Caldwell again
received a State Department appointment, this time U.S. Consul to
Costa Rica, a position he held from 1897 to 1909.
In 1909 Caldwell returned to Topeka and spent the remaining three
years of his life living with one or another of his children. He
died on August 31, 1912 at his daughter’s home in Calais, Maine. He
is buried with his wife and other family members in St. Stephen
Rural Cemetery in New Brunswick, Canada. General Caldwell may be the
only Civil War general buried in Canada. Reenactors of Company H,
Fifth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers, based in Canada’s Atlantic
Provinces are dedicated to caring for General Caldwell’s final
resting place, and each year conduct a graveside service to honor
him.
General Caldwell was loved by his men, and this is the truest test
of honesty, integrity and bravery on the battlefield. A soldier who
served with him prior to Gettysburg wrote, “Caldwell is an agreeable
man and well liked. There is none of the assumed dignity and
importance so common among officers … He is much more familiar with
his officers than General Meagher [of the Irish Brigade] and is much
better liked by them than M[eagher] by his.”
He was also appreciated by his fellow officers. General Alexander
Webb, who served with Caldwell as a division commander at Gettysburg
and afterwards, wrote on March 26, 1864, as Caldwell lost his
command: “Caldwell leaves in [?]. He feels very badly. I am very
fond of him, and am sorry to see him owsted.”
General John Curtis Caldwell’s life and career need additional
study, and his reputation as an “adequate” soldier should be
reassessed. His contributions to his country as a general officer of
the Army of the Potomac and as a post-war diplomat deserve to be
recognized.
Amherst College Biographical Record: Class of 1855
The Story of One Regiment: The Eleventh Maine Infantry Volunteers in
the War of the Rebellion
Ibid. p.29
Campbell, Eric. “Caldwell Clears the Wheatfield”. Gettysburg
Magazine, July 1990, Issue #3 p. 27
Warner, Ezra. Generals in Blue. p. 64
Sifakis, Stewart. Who Was Who in the Union. p. 62
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Peninsular campaign,
Seven Days’ Battles, Series I, Volume XI/2 [S#13]
Priest, John Michael. Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle p. 172
Ibid, p.182
Pride, Mike and Mark Travis. My Brave Boys: To War with Colonel
Cross & the Fighting Fifth. p. 143
Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg, The Second Day. p. 74
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Maryland Campaign,
Series I, Volume XIX/1 {S#27]
Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets, p. 256
Krick, Robert K. “It Appeared As Though Mutual Extermination Would
Put a Stop to the Awful Carnage: Confederates in Sharpsburg’s Bloody
Lane” in The Antietam Campaign, Gary Gallagher (ed.) p. 245.
Reardon, Carol. “The Valiant Rearguard: Hancock’s Division at
Chancellorsville” in Chancellorsville: The Battle and Its Aftermath,
Gary Gallagher (ed.) p. 170-171.
Hartwig, D. Scott. “ ‘No Troops on the Field Had Done Better’: John
C. Caldwell’s Division in the Wheatfield, July 2, 1863. in The
Second Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union
Leadership, Gary Gallagher (ed.) p. 147
Ibid., p. 156
Ibid., pp. 166, 169
Ibid., p. 169
Website of Company H, Fifth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers,
Reenactors. New Brunswick, Canada
Hartwig, D. Scott. Op cit. p. 138; Tagg, Larry. op cit. p. 36
Alexander Webb to his wife, cited in Coddington, The Gettysburg
Campaign, p.751 n.41, and Hartwig, op cit. p. 170.
SOURCES CONSULTED:
Amherst College Biographical Record: Class of 1855.
http://www.amherst.edu
Campbell, Eric. “Caldwell Clears the Wheatfield”. Gettysburg
Magazine. July 1990. Issue #3 Morningside Press. Dayton, Ohio, 1990.
Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command.
Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1968.
Committee of the Regimental Association. The Story of One Regiment:
The Eleventh Maine Infantry Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion.
New York, 1896. Reprinted Higginson Book Company, Salem,
Massachusetts, 1997.
Company H, Fifth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers, Reenactors, New
Brunswick, Canada. http://personal.nbnet.nb.ca/lmtitus/Intro.html
Hartwig, D. Scott. “ ‘No Troops on the Field Had Done Better’: John
C. Caldwell’s Division in the Wheatfield, July 2, 1863 in Gallagher,
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and Union Leadership. Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio &
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Shippensburg, PA, 2002.
Krick, Robert K. “It Appeared as Though Mutual Extermination Would
Put a Stop to the Awful Carnage: Confederates in Sharpsburg’s Bloody
Lane” in Gallagher, Gary W. (Ed.)
The Antietam Campaign. The University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill & London, 1999.
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of the 116th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War of the
Rebellion. Fordham University Press, New York, 1996
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the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Bonanza Books, New York, 1965.
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.
Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: The Second Day. The University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London, 1987.
Pride, Mike and Mark Travis. My Brave Boys: To War with Colonel
Cross & the Fighting Fifth. University Press of New England, Hanover
& London, 2001.
Priest, John Michael. Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle. Oxford
University Press, New York & Oxford, 1989.
Reardon, Carol. “The Valiant Rearguard: Hancock’s Division at
Chancellorsville”. in Gallagher, Gary W. (Ed.) Chancellorsville: The
Battle and Its Aftermath. The University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill & London, 1996.
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Popular Library, New York, 1983.
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& Oxford, 1988.
Tagg, Larry. The Generals of Gettysburg. Savas Publishing Company,
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Baton Rouge & London, 1964.
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