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| Posted: Thu Dec 21st, 2006 12:14 am |
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21st Post |
| Posted: Thu Dec 21st, 2006 01:46 pm |
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22nd Post |
HankC
Member
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Johnny Huma wrote: Now walk the field and put yourself if Lee's boots...
But Lee never had the chance to walk the field on Cemetery Ridge  Which brings us to an interesting line of thought...
Probably 99% of us know the field better than Lee and his generals. They were all working in the densest 'fog of war' - unfamiliar terrain in enemy territory. Seldom did they know what's over the next rise or beyond the tree line.
From our 21st century vantage point we've all seen the battlefield in air-conditioned, well-fed comfort from the left, the right and from up above. In an hour, we can a travel distances that took them 3 days to march. Civil war generals knew only what their scouts could tell them and it was usually jumbled, inaccurate, contradictory and second-hand.
Perhaps some Jedadiah was updating maps the first time through Gettysburg a week before, but Gettysburg, to them, was the pretty much the same, and, as important, as Fairfield or Mummasburg. We've seen Little Round Top, Culp's and Cemetery Hills; Lee, Ewell and Longstreet never did...
Cheers,
HankC
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| Posted: Sun Feb 15th, 2009 11:53 am |
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23rd Post |
Historicaly Correct
Member
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I'm gonna try to give you someting to think about.. I've benn reading alot on the battle of Chancellorsville and have also read the book Lost Triumph. Just to provoke some thought... Lee and Stonewall had a great understanding between them, as they met for the last time there was a lot of communication between them that was not spoken. Lee and Stonewall could visualize the others thoughts and ideas.(before any one getts the bright idea not ESP). Useing the battle at Chancellorsville, Lee used a tactic not unlike that of Gettysburg, dividing forces in the face of the enimey. Lee sent men to do jobs not knowing what the other hand was doing. As military history proves this can also be a bad thing too. Did Lee do the same thing here? who knows?
Yes I think the Union presence had alot to do with it, Tired horses, Men after 2 days of fighting, there are more than I can say.
HC
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| Posted: Mon Feb 16th, 2009 12:29 am |
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24th Post |
Ted51
Member
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I found the Carhart book extremely persuasive; as the original review observes, it explains many things about the third day that are otherwise difficult to understand. It may never be proven, but it outlines an interesting possibility.
Those who object on the grounds that the thesis of the book takes credit away from the Army of the Potomac are missing the point. By this stage of the war, the Union cavalry had improved in equipment, organization, training, and perhaps most of all, leadership. (Custer had been promoted from Captain to (Brevet) Brigadier General just weeks before Gettysburg.) The action at Brandy Station a few weeks earlier had proven that the Union cavalry were the equal of the Confederates in an offensive role. The action at Gettysburg shows that the Union horse could stand up to J.E.B. Stuart and company in a defensive role also. Custer’s improvised stand, if Carhart is right, messed up the timing of the attack and led to the fiasco on Cemetery Ridge.
If Carhart’s thesis is correct, then Stuart is open to criticism for being unable to punch through. Lee can also be faulted for what turned out to be an overly elaborate plan.
One final point may have a bearing on the lack of proof. Carhart contends that only a few people knew the full plan in the first place, and that those leaders maintained silence about it on the direct orders of General Lee. As to why Lee should do that, Carhart makes a weak argument that Lee wanted to protect Stuart’s reputation, and by the time Lee wrote a full report, Stuart was dead. I think another explanation is more persuasive.
Whether or not Lee had any particular historical battle in mind, the whole cavalry corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, reinforced by mounted infantry, could have been a devastating battlefield weapon, particularly in the relatively open country of Pennsylvania. If the plan had worked the way Carhart describes, the northern half of the Union position would have been completely surrounded. The remainder would have been outnumbered, Lee would push on to Washington, and the Union would be forced to sue for peace. Gettysburg would have been, in other words, the decisive battle so seldom achieved in the war. I believe – with no proof, to be sure – that Lee ordered silence about the plan because he hoped to get another chance to try it. Lee did not want to alert the Union to what he thought could be a war-winning maneuver.
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