Though the opportunity to develop high level officers is less, wouldn't that mean you would not spread so thin your officer corps, in effect streamlining it and making it more effective?
Your point is well taken, Orphan, and your corollary is sound. It would seem, however, that a streamlined officer corps failed Davis when it came time to replace JEJ. And it doesn't approach the argument of fleet and smooth unit movements, logistics, supply, and so on.
Will make it a point of looking up that book. If it isn't in my "Atlanta" stack, then I won't find it soon. It was a book of 7 or 8 essays having to do with that campaign.
I think I found it. The book I had in mind was The Campaign for Atlanta published by Savas-Woodbury in 1994 as part of a series called Campaign Chronicles. Series Editors where Theodore P. Savas and David A. Woodbury. The article I cited was, I think, written by Steven E. Woodworth and titled, "A Reassessment of Confederate Command Options During the Winter of 1863-1864."
I said "I think" because I didn't re-read the essay. If the essay doesn't specifically relate to unit-size and command development, it certainly does discuss in some detail Davis' options and command choices. Well worth reading.
