View single post by JoanieReb
 Posted: Sun Feb 10th, 2008 08:43 am
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Joined: Wed Jan 24th, 2007
Posts: 620

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"'Although Grant and his subordinates were frustrated at their inability to pierce Lee's lines at Cold Harbor, they did not consider the reverse any more serious than Lee's previous rebuffs. Reviewing the week's operations, Grant and Meade thought they had done rather well, having turned Lee out of his North Anna line, maneuvered him nearly 20 miles closer to the Confederate capital, and cornered him against Richmond. The attempt to punch through Lee's works at Cold Harbor had failed, but the campaign still had fair prospects for ultimate success.' (p. 387)"

I am wondering exactly whom Rhea is referencing when he speaks of Grants subordinates.  It would be interesting to see exactly what his officers had to say about it all.  When I can get to the university library, think I'll spend some time looking into this.

At the lowest level, the fighting men themselves, your good friend James McPherson seems to disagee in his discussions of what he calls "Cold Harbor syndrome". 

In looking for Grant's reasons to fight at Cold Harbor in the manner he so chose, I came across this, from James Mc:

"Grant's purpose was not a war of attrition - though numerous historians have mislabled it thus.  From the outset, he had tried to maneuver Lee into open-field combat, where Union superiority in numbers and firepower could cripple the enemy.  It was Lee who turned it into a war of attrition by skillfully matching Grant's moves and confronting him with an entrenched defense at every turn."  (Illus BCF 642)

Don't know quite where it fits in, but it is interesting.  Maybe the idea that Grant & Co. thought they had done rather well, manuvering Lee, when it sounds as if Lee had more control of the strategy than the above quote would lead one to believe.

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