|View single post by Scout|
|Posted: Tue Sep 16th, 2008 03:21 pm||
|Many of us have pondered these very same issues. For me, following his aggressive failures in and around Atlanta, Gen. Hood makes few decisions I understand.
Attempting to lure Sherman to the north by attacking his rail lines around Marietta and Allatoona may have worked, but Hood changed his mind and wanted to move North and take Nashville and possibly Kentucky...
some have suggested he even desired to join Lee in Virginia after this....an unreasonable idea which lends some notice on the man's grasp of reality in the fall of '64.
By not crossing the Tennessee nearer Chattanooga and delaying a month by moving nearly to Mississippi to cross at Florence/Muscle Shoals, Hood gave Schofield's two corps and Gen. Thomas dear time to gather/train his army at Nashville which in the beginning numbered less than 20,000.
His effort (Gen. Forrest found a great ford to bypass the federal position north of the river) at Columbia allowed for an excellent chance to separate Schofield's forces. But the fiasco at Spring Hill failed to allow for capitalization.
Then you have the disasters at Franklin and Nashville, followed by a retreat that only a vigorous rear-guard provided escape.
There are many good books about Nashville and the events that led to it. Stanley Horn's, The Decisive Battle of Nashville, comes to mind. About Franklin, Five Tragic Hours (the author escapes me I think McMurry) There are many topics to discuss about Hood's command of the AoT, perhaps we could narrow it?