|View single post by Kentucky_Orphan|
|Posted: Fri Nov 9th, 2007 02:20 am||
| I hope you understand that I'm not trying to deify Lee or support Lost Cause mythology, but rather, trying to throw in a little perspective here. Clearly, I don't think Lee is overrated, either.
I understand fully the intent behind your posting, never considered that you were either demeaning Lee or building him up to "Ares" status.
Not sure why my post drew a salvo about western vs. eastern troops
Simply felt compelled to list reasons of Lees success, it was implied in some recent fiction by Gingrich that somehow western federal troops were superior to their eastern counterparts and vise versa in the case of the confederacy. This I strongly disagree with, and as it is a variable to examine to explain Lee's success/failures felt it worth mentioning.
There's still the 38th parallel in Korea. And why is the US no longer in Vietnam?
This has as much to do with the U.S.'s refusal to go onto the offensive (due of course to the grander context of the Cold War) as it does the defensive tactics used by the enemy. Also in Korea it was more or less a stalemate brought on by inability of either side to gather sufficiently greater conventional forces (material or manpower) or maneuver in the terrain.
PGT Beauregard was the commander on the field at First Manassas. Joe Johnston was seriously wounded at Fair Oaks after mediocre performance, and Gustavus Smith, Johnston's replacement, was in command for two days before the burden of responsibility virtually shattered his nerves.
As you say, they had the chance but never accomplished what Lee did, and other generals never had the opportunity to try.(first Manasas had little to do with generalship IMO) If you study the seven days, you become acutely aware of the brilliance of his strategy (from the time he took command to 2nd Manasas may be Lees greatest stretch) and the inability/incompetence of the officers under him to coordinate and pull it off with the success possible. Lee really had no right to blame other officers for failures following this-though there were some mistakes made afterwards, for the most part his commanders as high as division command were, IMO, almost absurdly good(and by luck or skill the generals with the best attributes for a particular challenge were in the right place at the right time-just study the maryland campaign, escpecially D.H. Hills and Mclaws roles prior to concentrating at Sharpsburg to see what I mean).
We are more or less on the same page I believe Pvt, maybe a few differences in the logic tree but resulting in the same species in the end.